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Many current bankruptcy debates—from critical vendor orders to the Supreme 
Court’s decision last year in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corporation—begin with 
bankruptcy’s distributional rules and questions about how much discretion a judge 
should have in applying them. It is a mistake, however, to focus on distributional 
questions without first identifying the bankruptcy partition and ensuring it is properly 
policed. What appear to be distributional disputes are more often debates about the 
demarcation of the bankruptcy partition and the best way to police it. 
Once the dynamics of establishing and policing the bankruptcy partition are taken 
into account, there is little room for departures from bankruptcy’s distributional rules. 
There might be a few rare cases in which maximizing the value of the estate requires 
it, but these inhabit an exceedingly narrow domain so small and so hard to navigate 
that they are sensibly handled with a per se rule that prohibits them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The central ambition of Chapter 11 is to vindicate the creditors’ bargain.1 
By the common account, if those who contribute capital to a firm could 
bargain among themselves, they would agree on a set of rules that would 
maximize value. As a group, they prefer more to less. There is, however, an 
important qualification to this idea. When investors gather to invest in a 
common venture, their focus is on maximizing the value of that venture, 
rather than maximizing their total wealth as a group. The creditors’ bargain 
is similarly focused on the bankruptcy estate, something that is partitioned 
from the other interests of the creditors. The ambition of bankruptcy law is 
to put in place a process that maximizes its value. 
At first approximation, the assets inside the bankruptcy partition are easy to 
define. The assets available to the general creditors of a common debtor in 
bankruptcy are those available to them outside.2 The bankruptcy judge has no 
 
1 See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ 
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 862 (1982). We use this standard nomenclature, even while recognizing 
that the phrase is somewhat misleading because the bargain in question includes not just creditors, 
but shareholders as well. Both contribute capital to a common enterprise and, before the fact, each 
wants the managers of the firm to maximize the value of the enterprise across all states of the world. 
Modern finance teaches that “debt” and “equity” are only useful labels for common configurations 
of cash flow, control, and priority rights. There is no fundamental difference between them. 
2 This is the effect of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) and § 544(a). These constitute the bulk of the 
bankruptcy estate, but added to the bankruptcy estate under § 547 are also assets transferred on the 
eve of bankruptcy on account of antecedent debts. The ability to retrieve such preferential payments 
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power to bring other assets into the estate merely because appropriating such 
assets would make the creditors better off. Moreover, everyone’s focus is 
supposed to be on maximizing the value of the assets in the estate and not on 
how decisions might improve the outside assets or fortunes of the stakeholders. 
Also inside the bankruptcy partition is a forum—the bankruptcy court—
that resolves the rights of stakeholders. This process can extend beyond 
disputes about assets of the bankruptcy estate proper. Secured creditors must, 
for example, sort out their rights to their collateral as part of the bankruptcy 
process. Although bankruptcy respects nonbankruptcy entitlements, the 
rights of secured creditors, as well as those of others, are assessed according 
to “chancery methods.”3 Secured creditors can be forced to give up their rights 
to their collateral and to take something else in its stead, provided they 
receive its “indubitable equivalent.”4 Similarly, the bankruptcy court 
routinely enforces subordination agreements that creditors strike between 
themselves and uses its own procedures in the process.5 
Establishing exactly which rights are sorted out in the bankruptcy forum 
requires line-drawing. Claims a creditor has against the debtor are almost 
always resolved in bankruptcy. Rights two creditors have against each other 
that are unrelated to their stake in a common debtor are not.6 Other matters 
are less clear. It is important, however, to ensure that sorting out rights among 
stakeholders in the bankruptcy forum does not bring benefits to general 
creditors that they would not receive outside of bankruptcy. They should not 
enjoy “a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.”7 
This paper shows how focusing squarely on the bankruptcy partition 
sheds light on many debates about modern bankruptcy practice. Part I of the 
paper looks more closely at the assets and processes that take place inside 
bankruptcy. By doing so, it suggests how courts should approach a number of 
important questions—in particular third-party releases, which provide the 
bankruptcy court with the ability to release one party from liability to another 
as part of a larger plan to resolve the debtor’s affairs. 
 
prevents destructive asset grabs when bankruptcy is on the horizon. The trustee also has the power 
to bring in assets using the bankruptcy’s own fraudulent conveyance powers, but the overlap between 
this power and the ability to use state fraudulent conveyance law is quite close. It is best understood 
as a sensible way to approximate a nonbankruptcy cause of action enjoyed by the creditors, rather 
than as a bankruptcy-specific substantive power in its own right. 
3 See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337 (1966) (identifying bankruptcy courts as courts of equity). 
4 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2012) (“A subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this 
title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.”). 
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012) (stating that bankruptcy jurisdiction is limited to civil 
proceedings “arising under title 11, or arising in or related to a case under title 11”). 
7 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v. Mfr. Nat. Bank of Detroit, 
364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)). 
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Part II explores how the bankruptcy judge must police the bankruptcy 
partition in a fashion that ensures that the value of the estate’s assets is 
protected and that wasteful rent-seeking is minimized. In the process, it 
explicates bankruptcy’s longstanding prohibition on “gifting,” a practice in 
which senior stakeholders divert value from themselves to others during the 
course of the bankruptcy process. Focusing on the need to police the 
bankruptcy partition also sheds light on such doctrines as vote designation, 
rights offerings, and equitable subordination. 
Part III examines transactions that cross the partition. When the trustee 
seeks to maximize the value of the estate, she necessarily must transact with 
parties who hold assets outside the bankruptcy partition, including parties who 
are also prepetition creditors. Transactions benefiting the estate that involve 
assets outside the bankruptcy partition will, like any other mutually beneficial 
transaction, leave the party with assets on the other side of the partition better 
off as well. That the other party happens to be a prepetition creditor is not, on 
its own, reason to forbid it. But when a prepetition creditor is also a 
postpetition actor, opportunities for strategic behavior arise, and rules need to 
be put in place to minimize them. This perspective gives purchase on current 
controversies about critical vendor orders, roll-ups, settlements, and other 
postpetition transactions between the debtor and prepetition creditors. 
Focusing on the bankruptcy partition largely moots a question that has 
recently been hotly debated both in the courts and in the academy: whether 
the bankruptcy judge should enjoy the discretion to depart from bankruptcy’s 
distributional rules.8 Once the dynamics of establishing and policing the 
bankruptcy partition are taken into account, there is little room for departures 
 
8 A case before the Supreme Court explored whether the bankruptcy judge has discretion to 
depart from bankruptcy’s distributional rules at the end of the case. See Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding 
Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017) (holding that a bankruptcy court did not have the discretion to deviate 
without consent from the distribution scheme normally associated with a Chapter 11 dismissal). It 
has generated extensive academic commentary. See generally Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, 
Inequality and Equity in Bankruptcy Reorganization, KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (demonstrating 
that Pareto improvements, recently approved of as a standard for standard priority departures, 
appear in tests governing other types of departures); Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority: 
Corporate Reorganization After Jevic, 90 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (assessing the framework 
put forth in Jevic); see also Stephen J. Lubben, The Overstated Absolute Priority Rule, 21 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 581 (2016) (questioning the existence and validity of an absolute priority rule); 
Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ 
Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235 (2013) (exploring the centrality of fixed priority in bankruptcy 
proceedings and exploring incidents and implications of priority jumping); David A. Skeel, The 
Empty Idea of “Equality Among Creditors” 166 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 701 (2017) (“[I]f we look at current 
bankruptcy practice, creditor equality seems to be rapidly disappearing. Bankruptcy courts often 
bless arrangements that give one group of general creditors starkly different treatment than other 
groups.”). 
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from bankruptcy’s distributional rules.9 There might be some cases in which 
maximizing the value of the estate requires them, but these inhabit an 
exceedingly narrow domain so small and so hard to navigate that they are 
sensibly handled with a per se rule. 
I. THE CREDITORS’ BARGAIN AND THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE 
Thinking about bankruptcy policy sensibly begins with asking what 
creditors as a group would have agreed upon if they had been able to 
bargain with one another before the fact. Commentators often tacitly 
assume that bankruptcy law is built around the idea that creditors would 
agree to maximize their joint welfare, but this is too simple. The 
Bankruptcy Code focuses only on the assets of the estate itself and is 
designed to ensure that these assets bring the most value possible 
consistent with nonbankruptcy law. The trustee must try to maximize the 
value of what falls inside the bankruptcy partition, the line that separates 
the estate from the rest of the world.10 
 
9 Much of the commentary couches the problem as one of whether there should be departures 
from bankruptcy’s absolute priority rule, but nothing in our claim that departures from 
distributional rules should not be permitted turns on the absolute priority rule or any other 
distributional rule that bankruptcy law puts in place. It would apply equally, for example, to a regime 
that preserved the option value of junior creditors. For a discussion, see Anthony J. Casey, The 
Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759 (2011). It 
would also apply if there were no rank-ordering of creditor claims, and if it were simply a question 
of departing from bankruptcy’s long-time pro rata sharing rule. 
10 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012) (laying out what property may comprise the estate). In describing 
the bankruptcy partition, we are making a largely positive observation about existing bankruptcy 
law. We suggest why it makes sense to establish the bankruptcy partition and to focus on 
maximizing the value of what is inside, but our observations in the first instance are positive 
rather than normative. It might be possible to argue that, as a normative matter, the trustee should 
take into account the interests of creditors apart from the bankruptcy partition in a fashion 
analogous to some arguments about how boards should maximize shareholder welfare rather than 
the market value of the firm. 
These debates typically arise in the context of corporate social responsibility. For example, 
if shareholders as a group are environmentally conscious, they might want the board to reduce 
pollution more than legally required even if it means lower profits. Such a decision might leave 
the shareholders better off than they would be if the higher profits were turned over to them and 
the shareholders then spent them on activities that promoted the environment. For a rigorous 
analysis, see Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not 
Market Value, 2 J. L. FIN. & ACCT. 247 (2017). 
Nothing about these sorts of arguments is limited as a theoretical matter to corporate social 
responsibility. Any activity that improves the welfare of investors more than it reduces the value 
of the firm (or the bankruptcy estate) might in theory be something investors would favor in 
their ex ante bargain. A critical issue, however, is whether the decisionmakers are capable of 
assessing these costs and benefits. Our strong intuition is that performing such a calculus is well 
beyond what can reasonably be expected. 
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A. The Bankruptcy Partition and the Bankruptcy Estate 
Asset-partitioning is central to the modern account of the firm.11 Investors 
are better off when they can contribute capital to a discrete pool that is used 
for defined projects. The investor wants to limit her own liability if the project 
is unsuccessful, and, more importantly, wants to be able to monitor the fate 
of this project independent of all the other projects that fellow investors 
might have. The directors of a corporation are, thus, charged with maximizing 
the value of the firm itself.12 Those directors are not to take into account how 
actions they take at the firm benefit themselves—indeed, to do so would 
violate their duty of loyalty to the firm—or other parties in some other way. 
Focusing narrowly on the firm itself creates a risk of losing some projects that 
might be in the collective interests of all the stakeholders, but these losses are 
more than offset by the way the partition reduces monitoring costs. 
Bankruptcy law embraces this idea of asset partitioning. It works 
somewhat differently than asset-partitioning in the context of corporate law, 
however. Most significantly, the bankruptcy process sometimes resolves 
disputes among stakeholders even when the disputes do not involve assets 
that belong to the bankruptcy estate. There is a need to partition those 
disputes that are heard within the bankruptcy process from those that are not. 
There is no ready analogue in the context of an ordinary business entity, but 
the basic idea is the same. Directors of a corporation are charged with 
maximizing the value of the firm independent of the consequences for 
different investors with respect to other projects. The bankruptcy trustee (or, 
as is most often the case in Chapter 11, the debtor in possession) is charged 
with ensuring the most value is obtained from the assets of the estate without 
regard to how doing this affects the outside interests of the creditors.13 
In the hypothetical creditors’ bargain, creditors recognize that it is not 
possible to establish a relationship in which the benefits of every possible 
mutually beneficial deal among them is vindicated. Nor is it realistic for the 
bankruptcy process itself to account for all the possible effects that a 
reorganization might have for the welfare of the parties. To the extent 
 
11 See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 
110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000) (examining the role of organizational law as establishing asset-partitioning 
as a set of rights for all creditors). For an excellent discussion of asset-partition and organizational 
law, including its connection with bankruptcy, see Morgan Ricks, Organizational Law as Commitment 
Device, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1345-47 (2017). 
12 Of course, the obligation of directors to maximize the value of the firm is implemented in a 
way that limits second-guessing. They enjoy the benefit of the business judgment rule, and creditors 
can bring derivative actions against them only when the firm is insolvent. 
13 See In re Innkeepers USA Tr., 442 B.R. 227, 235 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (declaring “it is 
‘Bankruptcy 101’ that a debtor and its board of directors owe fiduciary duties to the debtor’s creditors 
to maximize the value of the estate”). 
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creditors and other stakeholders want to realize other benefits or pursue other 
rights, they must do so outside the bankruptcy process or rely on their ability 
to strike entirely consensual bargains with each other during the course of the 
bankruptcy itself.14 
The judicial inquiry becomes unmanageable if parties can justify 
transactions based on indirect benefits running to any stakeholder in any 
capacity. Imagine a debtor has to choose a new product line. It has two 
options. One choice indirectly benefits a creditor who happens to sell a 
product that is complementary to the first line, and the other choice benefits 
another creditor who happens to sell a different product that is 
complementary to the second line. The trustee is poorly equipped to trade 
off such benefits against each other. Things become even more complicated if 
we consider stakeholders who are also competitors or have investments that 
are equivalent to short positions in the debtor. 
To avoid the mess of sorting through these scenarios, the Bankruptcy 
Code forces the trustee to attend to the assets of the bankruptcy estate and 
ensure they are put to their best use. The bankruptcy judge ensures that the 
trustee (or the debtor in possession) maintains this focus, and she resolves 
only those disputes that are sufficiently related to the collective proceeding 
so that the creditors as a group are better off if it is resolved as part of the 
bankruptcy process. Limiting the focus of bankruptcy in this fashion both 
makes things manageable and reduces the ability of creditors to behave 
strategically. 
Once the focus is on the estate, the task is to maximize its value. There 
may also be distributional consequences that flow from decisions about how 
to use assets within the estate. Most obviously, senior investors favor safer 
projects and junior investors riskier ones. These tensions between junior and 
senior investors are pervasive.15 The Bankruptcy Code does have rules that 
mitigate these conflicts and prevent the tension from arising in the first 
 
14 We refer here to consensual bargains that are outside the partition. Some agreements among 
a group of creditors may be within the partition in that they distort the bankruptcy and therefore 
violate the principles behind the creditors’ bargain. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, & 
David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy on the Side, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 255 (2017) (exploring how 
intercreditor agreements and other ex ante side agreements among creditors can distort the 
bankruptcy process and destroy value for the estate); Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 
91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 593 (2017) (exploring how restructuring support agreements and other 
agreements among stakeholders can distort the bankruptcy process). 
15 The problem exists whenever those making the decisions do not bear all the costs and enjoy 
all the benefits of their decisions. Identifying agency costs is a central feature of modern finance. 
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305 (1976) (introducing the concept of agency 
costs, describing how they can arise as a result of debt and outside equity, and demonstrating who 
bears them and why). 
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instance. For example, the right of a secured creditor to insist on adequate 
protection has the effect of internalizing the costs of a risky project on the 
junior investors.16 But these tensions cannot be eliminated altogether, and to 
the extent they persist, no particular group’s interests take precedence.17 The 
focus remains on maximizing the value of the estate, and this works to the 
benefit of all the creditors over the long run. Those affected adversely are 
protected to the extent they can make ex ante adjustments to compensate 
themselves for the distributional consequences ex post.18 
The focus, however, is upon maximizing the value of the estate, not on the 
total return to creditors as a group. Consider the following example. One 
group of creditors consists of prepetition suppliers owed $20. The balance of 
creditors are institutional lenders owed $80. The debtor wants to sell its 
assets as a going concern. One buyer offers to pay the estate $50 for the assets 
of the firm. This buyer has no relationship with the suppliers and is 
indifferent as to how the $50 is distributed. Under bankruptcy’s pro-rata 
sharing rule, each creditor receives half of what it is owed. The suppliers will 
receive $10 and the other creditors $40. 
A second buyer appears and bids $40 for the firm. The suppliers are small, 
dispersed, and are not actively involved in the bankruptcy case, but this buyer 
is in the same industry as the debtor, and it has an ongoing relationship with 
virtually all of these prepetition suppliers. Because it does not want to 
jeopardize its relationship with them, this second buyer will top off the 
prepetition suppliers and pay them an additional $12 if it acquires the firm. 
 
16 See Douglas G. Baird, The Rights of Secured Creditors After Rescap, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 849, 
851-54 (discussing the dynamics of adequate protection). 
17 See, e.g., In re Cent. Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that, in 
deciding whether to settle a lawsuit, the trustee is obliged to maximize value for not only the 
creditors, but also the shareholders). A similar issue arises in the context of corporate law, and 
the analysis there is the same. See, e.g., Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 
12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017) (corrected Apr. 24, 2017) (“In a world 
with many types of stock . . . the question naturally arises: which stockholders? The answer is the 
stockholders in the aggregate in their capacity as residual claimants, which means the 
undifferentiated equity as a collective, without regard to any special rights.”); see also In re Trados 
Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 38 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The duty to act for the ultimate benefit of 
stockholders does not require that directors fulfill the wishes of a particular subset of the 
stockholder base.”). 
18 We are focusing in this Article on institutional investors holding diversified portfolios. 
More complicated issues arise when the rights holders are nonadjusting. As an empirical matter, 
however, such creditors occupy only a small part of the capital structure. Protections can be 
created for them through statutory grants of priority, inside and outside of bankruptcy. The 
structural foundations of the law of corporate reorganizations should be grounded on institutional 
creditors, at least in large cases. 
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For this reason, if the second buyer’s bid is accepted, the suppliers and the 
other creditors as a group will receive $52.19 
From the perspective of the creditors as a group, the second buyer is 
offering more (a total of $52 instead of $50), but this is not what matters. The 
first buyer is giving more to the bankruptcy estate ($50 instead of $40), and 
this is what is dispositive.20 The creditors receive 50¢ on the dollar from the 
estate if the first bid is accepted, but only 40¢ if the second one is. Because of 
the bankruptcy partition, the trustee must accept the bid of the first buyer. 
What matters is what each bidder is offering the estate in return for its assets. 
The money that one buyer will later give one of the prepetition creditors is 
irrelevant. The proper focus is entirely on what goes to creditors on account of 
their claims against the estate. 
There is nothing wrong with the second buyer topping off the prepetition 
trade creditors, but making such a payment does not put a thumb on the scale 
in their favor.21 Picking the first buyer might seem counterintuitive. By 
assumption, the second buyer values the firm the most and is willing to pay the 
most for it ($52 instead of $50), but the bankruptcy partition requires ignoring 
some of the benefits prepetition creditors receive from the second buyer. 
Such partitioning is a core feature of bankruptcy law. The Bankruptcy Code 
is premised on the idea that the benefits of limiting the bankruptcy calculus in 
this fashion outweigh the costs. The ultimate costs are smaller than they appear. 
Requiring the award of the firm to a buyer who puts a lower value on it does 
not necessarily mean that the firm will end up in the hands of this buyer. The 
parties themselves are free to bargain in the shadow of this rule. 
There is a deal to be cut between the old suppliers, who are topped off 
after the sale to the second buyer, and the institutional lenders who receive 
only a distribution from the estate. There is no guarantee, of course, that such 
 
19 This amount is the sum of what the suppliers and the other creditors end up receiving. 
Between the estate and the second buyer, the suppliers will receive their pro-rata share of the purchase 
price from the estate, which is $8. (This is 20% of the $40 that the second buyer pays for the firm.) 
An additional $12 is what is needed to pay them in full. The other creditors hold 80% of the claims 
against the debtor, so they will receive 80% of the $40 that the estate receives from the second buyer. 
This comes to $32. Hence, the total payments of the second buyer are $52 ($8 + $12 + $32). 
20 The reasons for the different valuations are irrelevant. Assume, for example, that an office 
building files for Chapter 11, and it is not worth enough to pay the creditors in full. It is completely 
appropriate for the shareholders, if they are the high bidders at an appropriately conducted auction, 
to reacquire the property in order to preserve the tax benefits they enjoy by virtue of their prior 
ownership. All that matters is that they are the ones paying “top dollar.” See Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. 
& Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 456-57 (1999) (“[I]t would, of course, be a 
fatal flaw if old equity acquired or retained the property interest without paying full value. It would 
thus be necessary for old equity to demonstrate its payment of top dollar . . . .”). 
21 As we discuss in Parts II and III, such side payments can be problematic if the suppliers are 
active in the case and exercise control over the bankruptcy process such that they might distort it. 
By assumption, this is not the case with the suppliers in this hypothetical. 
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a deal will happen but, as is always the case with Coasean bargaining, the cost 
of reaching such a bargain puts a cap on the loss that the parties face.22 
B. The Bankruptcy Partition and the Bankruptcy Process 
The estate includes all the assets that the debtor owns outside of 
bankruptcy and all the assets that the creditors could reach if they sued the 
debtor and reduced their claims to judgment.23 But the bankruptcy process 
does not merely partition assets. It also sorts out rights among stakeholders. 
For example, bankruptcy’s automatic stay prevents secured creditors from 
reaching their collateral, even when their security interests are fully 
perfected. Such collateral is property that, under nonbankruptcy law, secured 
creditors are entitled to repossess and sell. Bankruptcy alters this. Even if 
secured creditors have already taken possession of their collateral, they must 
return it. They must vindicate their rights to it through the bankruptcy 
process.24 A plan of reorganization can restructure a properly perfected 
security interest as long as the secured creditor is given the indubitable 
equivalent of its interest.25 
Expanding the bankruptcy partition to include the resolution and 
eventual recognition of such rights through a process that is consistent with 
the requirements of the collective proceeding ensures that a single secured 
creditor is not able to thwart a reorganization that works to the benefit of 
all the creditors. At the same time, the requirement that the secured creditor 
be given the indubitable equivalent of its collateral ensures that the 
partition is not shifted simply to give general creditors value that they could 
not enjoy outside of bankruptcy. 
For the most part, matters adjudicated inside the bankruptcy partition 
involve assets in which the debtor or its creditors have a stake. Actions that 
individual creditors have against a third party remain largely outside the 
bankruptcy partition. These include such things as a veil-piercing action or 
claims of misconduct against an indenture trustee that arise only on account 
 
22 In the absence of bargaining costs, the ability of two parties to bargain with one another 
always takes them to the Pareto frontier—a place where, by definition, all mutually beneficial 
transactions that can be made have been made. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 
3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 5 (1960) (noting that under conditions of perfect competition, private and 
social costs are equal). 
23 The Bankruptcy Code provides that these assets are inside the estate in 11 U.S.C. § 541 and 
§ 544(a), respectively. The assets that levying creditors could reach that do not belong to the debtor 
under § 541 include principally collateral when the secured creditor has failed to perfect its security 
interest by filing in the public records or otherwise curing the ostensible ownership problem. 
24 See United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (describing how secured 
creditors cannot retain possession of property that is part of a debtor’s estate). 
25 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (describing how a reorganization plan must be “fair 
and equitable with respect to a class”). 
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of a common relationship with the same debtor. Indeed, they remain outside 
even when all or nearly all of the creditors of the debtor have this independent 
action against a third party.26 
One can argue that such actions should be brought within the bankruptcy 
partition. It might be sensible to resolve such disputes as part of the 
bankruptcy process, as resolving them may make it easier to resolve the 
debtor’s own affairs. But whether they are brought in or not, it is an important 
distinction to keep in mind that adjudicating such rights through bankruptcy 
processes is completely consistent with recognizing them in full. And it 
vindicates no coherent bankruptcy policy to distribute any recoveries that arise 
from the resolution of such disputes to the creditors as a group rather than to 
those who would have been entitled to them outside of bankruptcy.27 
Our ambition here is not to determine exactly which disputes should be 
brought within the bankruptcy partition. Instead, it is only to make clear 
that the process for fixing rights among stakeholders is something that 
creditors might sensibly include as part of their ex ante bargain. The debtor 
may be able to confirm a plan only if it can resolve a dispute with a third 
party, but the third party might be willing to settle only if it can also settle 
with one or more creditors of the debtor who have independent causes of 
action against it. The debtor is unable to form a plan without other disputes 
being resolved at the same time. Coasean bargaining may not be possible, 
especially if there is more than one third party and more than one creditor 
has such an independent action. 
One can argue that overcoming such holdout problems is appropriately 
done in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy exists to consolidate the affairs of multiple 
creditors and a common debtor in a fashion that facilitates the resolution of 
 
26 See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 428 (1972) (“[N]owhere in 
the statutory scheme is there any suggestion that the trustee in reorganization is to assume the 
responsibility of suing third parties on behalf of debenture holders.”). Some courts have treated 
veil-piercing actions as part of the bankruptcy estate on the ground that the debtor could bring 
them outside of bankruptcy, and they are therefore property of the estate under § 541. See, e.g., 
Steyr-Daimler-Puch of Am. Corp. v. Pappas, 852 F.2d 132, 135-36 (4th Cir. 1988) (describing how 
the defendant’s claim is “property of the estate” within the meaning of § 541(a)(1)). But the 
reasoning of these cases is suspect. The gravamen of a veil-piercing action is that there is no 
difference between the corporation and the shareholder, which is inconsistent with the idea that 
one should be able to sue the other. At least one state supreme court has rejected this idea that a 
debtor can bring such an action. See In re Rehab. of Centaur Ins. Co., 632 N.E.2d 1015, 1017-20 (Ill. 
1994) (stating the reasons why an alter ego claim is not “property of the company”). 
27 This distinction is partially lost in the context of avoidance actions. Recoveries under 
§ 544(b) and § 548 are distributed generally among unsecured creditors even if only some of them 
would have been entitled to the recovery outside of bankruptcy. This is the unfortunate legacy of 
Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931). See Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. 725, 747 (1984) (“The virtually universal reading of Moore v. Bay, however, is that the Supreme 
Court held that the trustee could avoid the chattel mortgage entirely and that the $10,000 so 
recovered was an asset of the estate to be shared by all unsecured creditors.”). 
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disputes among them. Expanding the bankruptcy partition to include the 
power to settle such disputes might be part of the ex ante bargain that 
creditors would strike among themselves if they could. 
This rationale—that judicial orders can help bring about “global 
peace”—is especially easy to justify if the merits of the actions among the 
stakeholders are not obvious and the stakes are relatively small. At the same 
time, the more power the bankruptcy judge has over such disputes among 
stakeholders, the greater the danger that some creditors will be able to 
commandeer assets to which they are not entitled. Third-party releases 
illustrate the problem, and they are the focus of the next section. 
C. The Anti-Commandeering Principle and Third-Party Releases 
The bankruptcy judge enjoys the power to issue orders that protect and 
enhance the value of the bankruptcy estate. But this is only a shorthand. The 
bankruptcy judge is not empowered to issue an order simply because it makes 
the estate more valuable. The estate of a failing cell phone manufacturer 
would be more valuable if the bankruptcy judge could issue an injunction 
blocking the next release of the iPhone, but the bankruptcy judge has no 
power to issue such an injunction. Outside of bankruptcy, a manufacturer of 
an inferior product has no right to be insulated from competition, and it does 
not acquire such a right when it enters bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy establishes a procedure that overcomes collective action 
problems and allows creditors to vindicate their nonbankruptcy rights. The 
bankruptcy judge can use her powers to adjudicate such rights using 
bankruptcy’s expedited and streamlined procedures. This ability to resolve 
disputes swiftly in a single forum has the effect of increasing the value of the 
estate. But such a power is vastly narrower than possessing a general license to 
make the estate more valuable. The bankruptcy judge cannot use her power to 
resolve disputes merely as a way to capture value for the benefit of the estate. 
Someone without a previous relationship with the debtor who faces a 
potential liability of $80 from another person cannot give the debtor $40 in 
return for an order from the bankruptcy judge that will keep this other person 
from bringing a suit against her. To be sure, such release from liability 
increases the value of the bankruptcy estate by $40 and makes the creditors as 
a group better off. But it does this only because the release is part of a deal 
that captures part of the value of an asset that belongs to someone else—the 
cause of action one third party enjoys against another. The cause of action 
belongs neither to the debtor nor its creditors outside of bankruptcy. 
A harder question presents itself when resolving disputes between third 
parties makes it easier to resolve the debtor’s own affairs. Some circuits have 
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found that such third-party releases are absolutely forbidden.28 The circuits 
that do approve third-party releases typically rely on a multi-factored test, 
typically without any explanation of why these factors matter. The factors 
commonly set out are, however, at first approximation, consistent with the 
idea that third-party releases are thinkable when they facilitate the debtor’s 
own reorganization without at the same time depriving third parties of rights 
they would enjoy outside of bankruptcy. Resolving the dispute on the merits 
when it helps to reorganize the debtor does not need to have the effect of 
diverting value from a third party to the debtor.29 
Third-party releases are easiest to justify when the release affects a large 
group of similarly situated creditors and a supermajority are willing to accept 
the plan in which they are subject to a third-party release. In such a case, the 
dissenting creditors within the group are outliers. They are likely placing a 
value on the release that is unrealistically high.30 When a supermajority of 
creditors sees the wisdom of the settlement and votes in favor of it, they 
likely believe that the benefits of the plan of reorganization compensate 
them for what they are losing by virtue of the release. If each of the creditors 
is as well positioned as the others to value the release, the collective wisdom 
of the supermajority is more likely to reflect the benefits of accepting the 
plan than the views of a small minority. 
Even if a supermajority of similarly situated creditors consents to the 
release, one might require backup protection in addition to the approval by 
 
28 See, e.g., In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d 1394, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the 
defendant’s release provision was contrary to § 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code). 
29 One of the most commonly cited tests is the one set out in the discussion in In re Dow 
Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002): 
We hold that when the following seven factors are present, the bankruptcy court may 
enjoin a non-consenting creditor’s claims against a non-debtor: (1) There is an identity 
of interests between the debtor and the third party, usually an indemnity relationship, 
such that a suit against the non-debtor is, in essence, a suit against the debtor or will 
deplete the assets of the estate; (2) The non-debtor has contributed substantial assets 
to the reorganization; (3) The injunction is essential to reorganization, namely, the 
reorganization hinges on the debtor being free from indirect suits against parties who 
would have indemnity or contribution claims against the debtor; (4) The impacted 
class, or classes, has overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan; (5) The plan provides a 
mechanism to pay for all, or substantially all, of the class or classes affected by the 
injunction; (6) The plan provides an opportunity for those claimants who choose not 
to settle to recover in full and; (7) The bankruptcy court made a record of specific 
factual findings that support its conclusions. 
30 If each of the creditors have different bits of information about the value of the cause of 
action, the best estimate of the value is, other things being equal, the value estimated by the median 
creditor. This is a standard observation from “wisdom of the crowds” literature. See, e.g., JAMES 
SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF THE CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW 
AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 
3-22 (2005) (providing an overview of the wisdom of the crowds principle in action). 
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the supermajority. For example, one might require the judge to find explicitly 
that the dissenting creditors were receiving benefits from the plan that 
compensated them for what they were losing by virtue of the release. An 
independent assessment of whether the parties subject to a release are being 
compensated is akin to the best-interest-of-the-creditors test that protects 
dissenters in the Chapter 11 voting process.31 In such a case, bringing the 
resolution of such claims into the bankruptcy process can be defended in a 
straightforward way as a coherent extension of the creditors’ bargain. Binding 
a minority to the decision of the majority in this fashion is different from 
ordinary civil litigation, but completely consistent with notions of due 
process. It bears a kinship both with other bankruptcy procedures and with 
class-action settlements.32 
Even when all of those affected by a release of a third party from liability 
object, a judge might still be confident that the exercise of her power was in 
service of global peace if there were other ways in which she could be confident 
that there was complete compensation to the affected creditors. Forcing 
creditors with independent causes of action against third parties to accept their 
treatment under the plan in return for losing their actions against a third party 
is analogous to the way bankruptcy law treats security interests.33 
The reluctance of many courts to grant third-party releases and the 
insistence of others that it is an extraordinary remedy underscore the 
potential for abuse they bring. However, much mischief can be prevented by 
understanding that they are simply disputes that can be resolved on the merits 
as part of the bankruptcy process. What matters is that those with meritorious 
claims are compensated. Resolving disputes inside the bankruptcy partition 
according to Chancery methods is fully consistent with due process if there 
is compensation and nothing is lost by insisting on it. Parties forced to accept 
releases in the name of global peace can always be completely compensated. 
If they are not compensated, one should suspect that the estate is capturing 
the value of an asset—a cause of action one third-party has against another—
that does not belong to it. 
 
31 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2012). 
32 In class actions, a court may approve a settlement that binds class members “on finding that 
it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). Notably, the court may, but is not 
required, to provide class members a second opportunity to opt out at the settlement stage. See 
Jeannette Cox, Note, Information Famine, Due Process, and the Revised Class Action Rule: When Should 
Courts Provide a Second Opportunity to Opt Out?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 377, 401 (2004) (noting 
the discretionary nature of opt out at the settlement stage). 
33 Bankruptcy law allows a security interest, which is not an asset of the debtor outside of 
bankruptcy, to be brought into the estate and altered as long as the secured creditor is given value 
that is the indubitable equivalent of its collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2012). A third-party 
release imposed on a nonconsenting creditor might be treated the same way. 
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Situations do arise in which a creditor and the debtor have actions against 
the same third party, and the assets of the third party may be insufficient to 
satisfy both. It might seem that the bankruptcy partition should be extended 
to include such actions as well. If the action of the third party were successful, 
the pool of assets remaining after the judgment was satisfied might be 
insufficient to satisfy the debtor’s claim. 
One might argue that such a limited pool itself creates a bankruptcy-
policy justification for resolving a third-party claim inside the bankruptcy 
partition. By bringing this action into a collective proceeding along with the 
debtor’s action against the third party, one can ensure that there is not a 
destructive race to the third-party’s assets.34 The argument is even stronger 
when the action against the third party exists against the debtor as well and 
the party is entitled only to a single recovery. 
But one must consider whether expanding the bankruptcy partition in 
this fashion makes sense when it is possible for the third party to enter into 
its own bankruptcy.. If the third party did commence such a stand-alone 
bankruptcy action, the debtor’s claim, the other party’s claim, and everyone 
else’s rights against the third party would be sorted out in that forum. The 
debtor’s cause of action is an asset of the estate. That its vindication takes 
place in a different forum may not be of any special moment.35 
There is much to be said for the idea that bankruptcy should be an all-or-
nothing affair. Bankruptcy’s different powers are conceived as a coherent set 
of powers designed to sort out the problems of a debtor in a single forum. 
They should not be unbundled from one another. The third party should either 
be in bankruptcy with all its creditors subject to the automatic stay and with 
an estate assembled for their benefit, or it should be outside of bankruptcy 
entirely. When we empower the bankruptcy judge in one bankruptcy 
proceeding to sort out the financial distress of another debtor, the second 
debtor is subject only to some of the powers of the bankruptcy judge. 
If one believed that the benefits and burdens of bankruptcy are sensibly 
constructed as a package, one should want to limit the ability of bankruptcy 
judges to exercise authority over a third party on the ground that the third 
party has a limited pool of assets. In contrast, the less confident one is that 
 
34 Arguments of this sort were put forward to justify staying litigation a creditor had brought 
against a third-party in the Caesars bankruptcy. See In re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., 808 F.3d 
1186, 1188 (7th Cir. 2015) (Posner, J.) (describing how the bankruptcy process does not allow any 
creditor to “jump the line”). 
35 It might be more convenient for the bankruptcy judge to hear such actions, but it is not 
compelled. In any event, when the action in question is a contract dispute or some other common 
law action, the bankruptcy judge herself does not even have the power to resolve it on the merits 
without the consent of the parties, as she is not an Article III judge. See Wellness Int’l Network, 
Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1940 (2015) (describing the limited authority that bankruptcy courts 
have in resolving “non-core proceedings”). 
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the processes and procedures of bankruptcy are a coherent whole, the more 
one should be willing to allow the bankruptcy judge to settle some, but not 
all, of the problems of financial distress that the third party faces. In all 
events, one of the challenges in establishing the bankruptcy partition 
requires confronting the question of whether the third party must be 
exposed to all of the consequences of bankruptcy when there are competing 
claims to limited assets. 
Of course, if a second bankruptcy is required to sort out the competing 
claims of the first debtor and other creditors, the question then is whether the 
two bankruptcies should be consolidated together and resolved 
simultaneously. The prevailing view tends to forbid substantive consolidation 
across estates absent extraordinary circumstances and limit administrative 
consolidation to those cases in which the various debtors are related entities 
in the same corporate group.36 
One can easily imagine things quickly getting out of hand if the rules 
governing consolidation were mandatory and inflexible. When an industry 
becomes distressed, a number of firms in the same industry with relationships 
with one another enter bankruptcy at the same time. It may make sense to 
treat each bankruptcy of unrelated entities as a stand-alone affair. Each debtor 
can participate in the other bankruptcies in which it has the rights of a 
creditor on the same terms as other creditors. 
D. Demarcating the Bankruptcy Partition 
Connecting the demarcation of the bankruptcy partition to the creditors’ 
bargain does not itself resolve close cases, but it does make it possible to 
identify some cases that are easy. Consider the following hypothetical.37  The 
debtor owes its workers $120 and its other creditors $240.The debtor’s sole 
asset is a fraudulent conveyance action against a private equity fund that is 
costless to bring and will yield $120 with fifty-fifty probability. In addition, 
the workers have an independent, stand-alone cause of action against the same 
private equity fund completely unrelated to the workers’ dealings with the 
debtor. If they can find the resources to bring the action against the private 
equity fund, they will succeed with certainty and generate a judgment of $80. 
The workers, however, can bring claims against the private equity fund only 
if they receive a large enough distribution from the debtor’s bankruptcy. The 
 
36 See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that courts tend to “respect 
entity separateness absent compelling circumstances calling [for] equity”). 
37 This hypothetical and related ones introduced in the balance of the paper are loosely based 
on the facts of Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017). For a comprehensive view of 
the case and structured dismissals, see Bruce Grohsgal, How Absolute Is the Absolute Priority Rule in 
Bankruptcy? The Case for Structured Dismissals, 8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 439 (2017). 
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private equity fund is solvent and fully able to satisfy the two judgments even 
if it loses both actions. 
The workers do not have the right incentives when it comes to settling 
the fraudulent conveyance action. They may press for settlement on the cheap 
if it gives them enough to pursue their claim against the private equity fund. 
This may be better for them than allowing the fraudulent conveyance action 
to go to trial and risk receiving nothing from either the fraudulent conveyance 
action or their stand-alone claim against the private equity fund. At the same 
time, they will fight against settlements that are in the interests of the 
creditors as a group if the settlements do not bring enough to finance the 
litigation against the private equity fund. In the extreme case, the workers 
may urge the debtor to refuse all settlements and try to hit a home run. 
In reviewing any settlement of the fraudulent conveyance action, the 
bankruptcy judge must ensure that those negotiating on behalf of the debtor 
have focused on the correct question: whether it leaves the estate better off 
than it would be if the settlement offer was declined and the debtor litigated 
the avoidance action. Under these facts, there should not be any settlement 
that is for less than $60. A settlement for less than $60 might enable the 
workers to bring their own action against the private equity fund, but this 
benefit to the workers lies outside the bankruptcy partition. As far as the 
bankruptcy process is concerned, the use to which the workers or anyone else 
might put their share of the settlement is irrelevant. It is not a benefit to the 
estate. To this extent, those negotiating the settlement must keep the workers’ 
cause of action separate from the bankruptcy estate. 
Now change the hypothetical slightly. Assume that the other creditors 
(and not the workers) control the creditors’ committee and the direction of 
the case. They negotiate with the private equity fund, and they reach a deal 
in which the private equity fund will contribute $90 to the estate in exchange 
for the settlement of the fraudulent conveyance action, but the settlement 
also includes a release of the workers’ completely independent cause of action 
against the private equity fund that is entirely unrelated to any dealings that 
the private equity fund had with the debtor. The institutional lenders, of 
course, favor this plan. Under it, they receive $60 instead of $40.38 The 
workers oppose it, as they receive a total of $30 instead of the $60 they would 
have received if there were no settlement.39 
 
38 The other creditors hold two-thirds of the debt ($240 out of a total of $360). Hence, they 
receive two-thirds of whatever is recovered from the private equity fund, either from the 
settlement ($90) or from pursuing the litigation (a fifty-fifty chance of $120). Two-thirds of $90 is 
$60; two-thirds of $60 is $40. 
39 The workers receive one-third of anything the estate receives from the private equity fund. 
Hence, their pro rata share of the $90 settlement is $30. They receive in expectation $60 if the 
litigation is pursued. Half the time the fraudulent conveyance action will yield nothing, and the 
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Under these assumptions, the bankruptcy judge should have little difficulty 
rejecting the settlement. There is no procedural benefit from bringing the 
workers’ cause of action into the bankruptcy process. The only thing that the 
third-party release is doing is bringing part of the settlement value of the 
workers’ independent cause of action into the estate. (The private equity fund 
is, in essence, paying $60 to settle the fraudulent conveyance action and another 
$30 to rid itself of the workers’ action.) No bankruptcy policy justifies this. The 
workers’ cause of action does not belong to the estate. 
II. POLICING THE BANKRUPTCY PARTITION 
In addition to identifying assets that need to be within the partition, the 
bankruptcy judge must police the behavior of the parties with respect to what 
lies inside the partition. In the first instance, the bankruptcy judge must 
ensure that, as they advance their interests as creditors, parties do not engage 
in rent-seeking that distorts the bankruptcy process. In addition, the 
bankruptcy judge must ensure that creditors, while navigating the bankruptcy 
process, are not advancing some outside agenda. She must also prevent them 
from making side deals that keep her in the dark. Such policing must take 
place before there is any distribution of assets. It ensures the integrity of the 
bankruptcy process and is antecedent to the ultimate allocation of assets. 
A. Rent-Seeking and the Bankruptcy Partition 
Consider another variation on the hypothetical developed in the previous 
part. The institutional creditors and the workers are again owed $240 and $120 
respectively. Assume that the creditors’ committee is again in control of the 
case and have $90 that they are prepared to distribute to the general creditors, 
including the workers. The workers have an independent action against a 
third party that has no relationship of any kind with the debtor. This action, 
if brought, will net them $80 with certainty. They do not, however, have the 
resources they need to bring the action unless they receive a distribution from 
the estate. Assume now, however, that the third party approaches the 
creditors’ committee and offers to contribute $30 to the estate on the 
condition that nothing is distributed to the workers. 
The creditors’ committee is charged with maximizing the value of the 
estate. The estate is worth $90 if the offer from the third party is rejected, but 
 
workers will lack the resources needed to sue the private equity fund. As a result, they will end up 
with nothing. But the other half of the time, the workers will enjoy $40 when the estate wins the 
fraudulent conveyance action and $80 from the independent action against the private equity fund 
(now that the settlement gives them the resources they need to bring it). A fifty-fifty chance at $120 
is worth $60. 
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it is worth $120 if it is accepted. There is no commandeering. The workers 
still have their cause of action against the private equity fund. That they need 
additional resources to bring it is a concern that falls outside the bankruptcy 
partition. The problem seems to raise squarely the question whether 
bankruptcy’s distributional rules should give way to the principle of asset 
maximization. In theory, the ex ante bargain could compensate creditors in 
the position of the workers for the possibility of a departure from the 
distributional rule in any given case.40 
A departure from bankruptcy’s distributional rule, whatever it is, cannot 
be justified here. Parties with control over the bankruptcy process, such as 
the creditors’ committee in this example, should not be able to put it up for 
sale. Accepting the money maximizes the value of the estate ex post and 
involves no third-party release, but it is most unlikely that allowing such a 
departure would ever be part of the creditors’ bargain given the fear that 
having such a power would routinely generate rent-seeking in the bankruptcy 
case. Parties to the creditors’ bargain, like parties to any bargain, insist on the 
rules governing the process to be insulated against manipulation. 
Allowing those who control the bankruptcy process to compromise its 
distributional rules for a price invites mischief. Allowing those with their 
hands on the levers of control of the case to sell the process invites them to 
spend resources looking for such opportunities. This anti-hijacking principle 
has nothing to do with the particulars of any given distributional scheme. 
Once any set of distributional rules is put in place, the integrity of the process 
requires that they be respected. 
B. Guarding Against Creditors with Ulterior Motives 
When establishing rules of corporate governance and in many other 
contexts in which potential conflicts are manifest, elaborate rules deal with 
outside interests. Directors and officers are generally required to vote and act 
as fiduciaries of public corporations.41 The moment they have a conflict, they 
must reveal it to independent directors or to the shareholders for a cleansing 
 
40 One might push back for normative reasons in a case such as this in which the creditors in 
question are not institutional investors holding diversified portfolios, but there is no need to reach 
this question here. As explained in the text, departing from the distributional rule makes no sense 
even in the strongest case in which ex ante compensation is entirely unproblematic. 
41 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (“[T]he duty of 
loyalty mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes precedence 
over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not shared by the 
stockholders generally.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“In carrying out 
their managerial roles, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation 
and its shareholders.”). 
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vote.42 Without a cleansing vote, they risk losing the protections of the 
business judgment rule.43 By contrast, shareholders are generally permitted 
to vote however they see fit unless they hold a controlling stake.44 
These rules cannot be mechanically transferred to the bankruptcy process. 
The bankruptcy process is a complicated dance in which the votes of 
stakeholders determine the firm’s future. Through plan voting and litigation, 
they exercise even more direct control than shareholders, and their own 
agendas never match those of the firm as a whole. 
Bankruptcy law does not expect participants in the bankruptcy process 
to act as pure fiduciaries of the estate. But it also does not allow them to use 
their position to act opportunistically to further their outside interests. 
Judges use the bankruptcy partition to channel the self-interest of the 
parties. Stakeholders cannot bring their outside interests to bear when they 
participate in the bankruptcy process, but, in asserting their rights to the 
assets of the estate, they can choose the course that maximizes the value of 
their own stake in the firm. 
Consider another variation on the hypothetical. Assume that, in order 
to prevent workers from bringing an action against it, a private equity fund 
resolves to vote against any plan that pays the workers’ claim in cash.45 
Under these circumstances, the bankruptcy judge would very likely 
disqualify the private equity fund’s vote.46 
Third parties cannot exploit the levers of the reorganization process to 
advance ulterior interests.47 To be sure, it is sometimes hard to draw the line 
between advancing an ulterior agenda and protecting one’s own interests as a 
stakeholder. But many cases are easy. For example, disgruntled former 
employees who have started a competing firm cannot acquire claims and cast 
their votes to inflict misery on their former employer.48 A developer who 
 
42 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2018). 
43 Id. For a discussion of the history of the law on interested transactions in Delaware and 
elsewhere, see Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 903, 910-11 (2011). 
44 See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994) (setting forth the 
standards for controlling shareholder liability, particularly the entire fairness standard). 
45 In this hypothetical, as in others, we are ignoring the statutory priority that the workers in 
Jevic enjoyed for part of their WARN Act claim. To the extent that the workers enjoyed statutory 
priority, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) would prevent such a plan from being imposed on the workers as it 
requires payments for such priority claims to be in cash when the class rejects the plan. 
46 The bankruptcy judge enjoys the power to “designate”—disqualify—votes that are cast in 
bad faith. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2012). 
47 See DISH Network Corp. v. DBSD N. Am., Inc. (In re DBSD N. Am., Inc.), 634 F.3d 79, 
102 (2d Cir. 2011) (stating that a bankruptcy court may designate the vote of a party who votes with 
an ulterior motive). 
48 See In re MacLeod Co., 63 B.R. 654 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (determining that an intent to 
destroy or injure a debtor’s business to further one’s own interests constitutes bad faith). 
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recaptures rights if a debtor goes through foreclosure instead of reorganization 
cannot buy claims for the purpose of defeating the reorganization.49 
At the same time, creditors are entitled to advance their own interests as 
creditors.50 As long as a creditor is voting for a plan that it believes will 
maximize the value of its stake in the firm, it is free to do so.51 But it is one 
thing for a creditor to try to maximize the value of a claim and quite another 
to use its vote to force the debtor to choose a path for the firm that suits the 
creditors’ outside interests. A third party cannot buy claims merely to control 
the reorganization process and persuade the debtor to sell key assets to it.52 
As the Second Circuit explained, when affirming a bankruptcy court’s 
designation of a claims buyer’s vote as bad faith: “In effect, [the claims buyer] 
purchased the claims as votes it could use as levers to bend the bankruptcy 
process toward its own strategic objective of acquiring [the debtor’s assets], 
not towards protecting its claim.”53 
These principles suggest a court would have little difficulty (apart from 
questions of proof) in constraining the private equity fund if it voted a 
particular way (against any plan that paid the workers in cash) in order to 
thwart the workers’ independent action against it. The private equity fund 
does not owe fiduciary duties to other stakeholders, and it is free to advance 
its own interests as a stakeholder, but it is not free to promote other interests 
it might have. The private equity fund’s stake in the debtor has nothing to do 
with its position in third-party litigation. Action taken solely in pursuit of 
the latter objective should not be permitted. 
For this reason, in this hypothetical the private equity fund’s vote could be 
“designated.” It is voting against a plan solely because the payout to the workers 
was in a form that would enable them to initiate litigation against it.54 It is not 
 
49 See In re Dune Deck Owners Corp., 175 B.R. 839 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he Court 
must decide whether the creditor opposes the plan because of how it affects its claim, or instead, 
because the creditor really seeks to obtain some collateral advantage in another capacity.”). There 
are, of course, cases where matters are uncertain, especially when an outsider buys claims with a 
view to acquiring the firm as a whole. 
50 See Figter Ltd. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 118 F.3d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting 
that “no bad faith is shown when a creditor chooses to benefit his own interest as a creditor”). At 
the same time, however, a creditor cannot undermine the reorganization itself or act in a way that 
“prevent[s] the Court from directing and having visibility into events unfolding in the case.” 
LightSquared LP v. SP Speciall Opportunites LLC (In re LightSquared Inc.), 511 B.R. 253, 360 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). The court in In re LightSquared went on to hold that the creditor who 
deliberately derailed the reorganization process be equitably subordinated. Id. at 361. 
51 See Figter Ltd., 118 F.3d at 639. 
52 In re DBSD, 634 F.3d at 104. 
53 Id. 
54 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2012) (allowing a court to designate “any entity whose acceptance or 
rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good faith”). 
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voting to maximize the value of its share of the bankruptcy estate, but rather to 
advance an interest that stands outside of the bankruptcy partition. 
Matters are different when, as in earlier variations on the hypothetical,55 
the private equity fund is not voting on a plan, but rather negotiating a 
settlement. The private equity fund can argue that, with respect to the 
settlement of a cause of action against it, it stands as a third party outside 
the bankruptcy partition. There is a difference between participating in the 
shape of the plan of reorganization and defending against litigation brought 
by the debtor. In the former capacity, the private equity fund must conform 
to bankruptcy’s rules of engagement, but, in the later capacity, it enjoys the 
same freedom to deal with the debtor at arm’s length. When subject to 
litigation from the debtor, the private equity fund is, precisely because of 
the bankruptcy partition, entitled to treat the debtor as a stranger. In this 
capacity, it is free to demand the same settlement terms that it could 
demand in any other litigation. 
But there is a big difference between what the private equity fund could 
demand as an outsider and that to which the creditors’ committee could agree. 
Accepting demands about the distribution of the debtor’s estate and allowing 
an outsider to dictate the shape of what is in effect a plan of reorganization is 
inherently troublesome. And, as we explore in the next Section, it is especially 
troubling if money is being diverted to the creditors’ committee at the same 
time the committee is approving the private equity fund’s plan. 
C. Side Payments 
In addition to ensuring that creditors do not act with ulterior motives, the 
bankruptcy judge must police the behavior of those who exercise control of 
the bankruptcy process to ensure that the judge remains able to ensure that 
the process’s procedures are respected. Among other things, she must be alert 
to side payments that distort the behavior of those who exercise control over 
the bankruptcy process. Just as a creditor who is a competitor cannot misuse 
bankruptcy procedure to enhance its outside interest, another creditor cannot 
make a side payment to someone with influence over the bankruptcy process 
with the aim of distorting it.56 
One needs to be cautious. Transfers from a creditor to someone with 
control over the case are not necessarily problematic. In theory, junior parties 
should not be able to invoke procedures that are wasteful and unnecessary. 
Indeed, a junior creditor’s vote can be designated when it is merely asserting 
 
55 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
56 In re Bush Indus., 315 B.R. 292, 306 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2004) (involving a plan not proposed 
in good faith when a secured creditor promises to continue to pay former CEO who is cooperating 
with the plan process but who will not actually do any work for company). 
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procedures in order to extract value for itself.57 But there is a substantial 
domain in which procedures are unnecessary yet not abusive. One creditor 
may have the right to bring a procedural objection that brings little or no value 
to the estate as a whole. In this case, a creditor is not distorting the process if 
it makes a payment to keep such an objection from being made. 
When a senior creditor who manifestly is owed more than the firm is 
worth wants to bring the bankruptcy process to a speedy conclusion, her 
decision to pay money to someone to truncate unnecessary procedures is, in 
the view of many, unobjectionable.58 Some suggest that senior creditors 
should be able to make payments to junior creditors and to professionals who 
have done work for the debtor, the creditors’ committee, and other 
constituents to ease frictions.59 The amount of money tends to be small in the 
grand scheme of things. Nor is it troubling to some that the secured creditor 
is paying for professionals who work for others. The process is being run for 
the benefit of the secured creditor, so it is entirely sensible that she pays for 
it. The senior creditor should be able to use what is, in effect, her own money 
to bring the case to a swift conclusion when all the relevant issues are plain 
for all to see. Such payments are analogous to those routinely made when 
civil litigation is settled. 
Distinguishing such “tips” from troublesome side payments can be hard, 
but the bankruptcy partition provides guidance. Consider one last variation: 
The only asset of the estate is again the fraudulent conveyance action. The 
private equity fund offers to settle that action, but insists on a distribution 
that gives the creditors’ committee more than it would ordinarily receive. 
This should not be permitted either. 
On its face, the settlement is a deal between the private equity fund and 
the estate, with the creditors’ committee acting on behalf of the estate. The 
money then passes from the estate to the creditors’ committee according to its 
terms. But the structure of the deal invites a different characterization. Instead 
of a payment from the private equity fund to the estate that is distributed 
according to a special scheme departing from the usual distributional rules, 
 
57 In the words of William O. Douglas when he was the head of the SEC and testifying to 
Congress on what would become the Chandler Act, it is not legitimate for a creditor to engage in 
holdup behavior and tell another stakeholder, “For a price, you can have our vote.” Revision of the 
Bankruptcy Act: Hearing on H.R. 6439 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 182 (1937) 
(statement of William O. Douglas). 
58 See AM. BANKR. INST. COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, 2012–2014: 
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 238 (2014) (“[M]any commentators and some courts 
assert that class-skipping gifts lead to efficient resolutions and foster the bankruptcy policy of 
consensual plans.”). 
59 See id. at 239 (“[A]llowing senior creditors to pay a small gift or tip to junior creditors can 
resolve objections to plan confirmation, facilitate the debtor’s reorganization, and disperse value 
further down the debtor’s capital structure.”). 
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the payment could be characterized as a transfer from the private equity fund 
directly to the creditors’ committee. In return for the payment, the creditors’ 
committee agrees to drop the fraudulent conveyance action. 
The transaction, in other words, might be objectionable because the 
creditors’ committee, as matter of substance, is taking money in return for 
stepping away from the fraudulent conveyance action. The creditors’ 
committee might not have the resources to litigate the action to the end, but 
it might have enough to do some digging and this might be sufficient to 
change the dynamics of the case. For example, there might be a bad email 
among the private equity investors at the time of the buyout suggesting that 
the deal left the debtor with unreasonably small capital.60 In order to ensure 
that the email never comes to light, the private equity firm offers a 
settlement, the proceeds of which must go to the committee and its 
professionals. This “settlement” with a special distributional proviso is 
nothing of the sort; rather it is a side payment to the creditors’ committee 
intended to pay them to stop their investigation. 
The members of the committee are better off taking the side payment, 
rather than pursuing the litigation. Although each dollar of the side payment 
makes them better off, any value they capture for the estate through litigating 
the claim has to be shared. And the workers do not have to be part of the side 
deal. As long as the workers have no ability to exercise influence over the 
avoidance action, there is no need to pay them to look the other way. 
Because of such possibilities, it is important for a bankruptcy judge to ask 
whether any particular settlement has the effect of distorting the bankruptcy 
process. The phenomenon, however, is not limited to settlements. It exists 
whenever value passes from one player in the bankruptcy process to another. 
Consider the facts of In re ICL Holding Co.61 In that case, the debtor proposed 
to auction off the company, and the senior creditor planned to bid.62 If the 
senior creditor bid its claim at the auction and that bid was the high bid, the 
senior creditor would end up as the owner of the firm.63 Negotiations over 
the rules governing the auction ensued. In return for an agreed-upon sales 
process, the senior creditor agreed to pay the professionals of the committee 
and provide several million dollars to the creditors’ committee.64 If, as 
 
60 This would be enough to satisfy the elements of a fraudulent conveyance action. For an 
example of a case in which there was such an email, see In re TOUSA, Inc., 422 B.R. 783, 793-94 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009). 
61 802 F.3d 547 (3d Cir. 2015). 
62 Id. at 550. 
63 Id. at 550-51. 
64 Id. at 551. 
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happened, the senior creditor proved the high bidder, the government would 
receive nothing for its tax claim.65 
These payments might have been side payments that distorted the 
process. The senior creditor may have feared that their liens were not sound 
or that more shopping around of the firm would bring out additional buyers. 
The payment to the creditors’ committee may have had the effect of 
preventing what a well-run bankruptcy process requires. The procedures of 
the bankruptcy process permit everyone to raise objections, but not all parties 
are equally well positioned to raise them. Here, the government’s tax lawyers 
were not privy to the particulars of the business. By contrast, the creditors’ 
committee had access to information about the debtor and the debtor’s 
business. It was thus much better able to assess whether the senior creditor’s 
proposed auction would yield top dollar. The side payment might have 
induced the creditors’ committee to look the other way, drop its objections, 
and support the sale. 
On the other hand, ICL Holding might be an illustration of a 
permissible “tip.” The senior creditor was not trying to prevent an auction 
that secured top dollar, but rather was striking a bargain that avoided 
unnecessary and costly procedures. The trick is distinguishing between 
legitimate “tips” that avoid unnecessary process and illegitimate side 
payments that cover up mischief. 
The Third Circuit ultimately upheld the bankruptcy judge’s approval of this 
bargain.66 It gave weight to the fact that the payment was not a distribution of 
property of the estate. Taking into account whether estate property was 
involved may be sensible: payment from the estate may be more problematic 
than payments from elsewhere. Nevertheless, nothing in the opinion suggests 
that anything goes as long as the money parties are exchanging among 
themselves is not property of the estate. If a payment is effectively a side 
payment that disrupts the bankruptcy process, the bankruptcy judge must step 
in, regardless of where the money comes from. 
The Third Circuit was willing to defer to the bankruptcy judge’s implicit 
judgment in ICL Holding that the senior creditor was in a position similar to 
someone making a payment to settle ordinary civil litigation. The senior 
creditor was paying the creditors’ committee in order to avoid unnecessary 
procedures that do nothing to maximize the value of the estate. The payment 
did not take anything from the estate because the procedures that were being 
waived would not have benefitted the estate. To a large extent, parties can sell 
their nuisance value on the side—that is, outside the bankruptcy partition. 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 555-56. 
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But they cannot sell procedural rights that might benefit others in the estate, 
because those are inside the partition. 
When the question is one of a judge policing the behavior of creditors 
during the bankruptcy process, the judge is not asking whether some creditors 
received more from the estate than they were entitled. Instead, she is asking 
whether the overall negotiations were conducted in a fashion that could be 
trusted to maximize the assets within the bankruptcy estate. Regulation of 
the partitioned bargaining environment, rather than following any particular 
distributional rule, is what matters most. 
Exactly how the bankruptcy judge polices the process turns on context. 
In the case of confirming a plan of reorganization, there are elaborate and 
hard-edged rules. Absolute priority must be enforced unless two-thirds of 
a class in amount and one-half in number consent.67 A plan can be 
confirmed only if at least one impaired class accepts.68 Administrative 
expenses must be paid in cash.69 
When the bankruptcy judge is confirming a plan, there is at least one hair-
trigger: there is a strong presumption against any payment that flows from a 
senior creditor to a junior one that skips over an intervening, nonconsenting 
class.70 This “anti-gifting rule” operates even when there is strong evidence 
that the senior creditor is owed more than the firm is worth. It nips 
mischievous side payments in the bud and aims at ensuring that the plan-
formation process is squeaky clean. As the Second Circuit put it, “if the 
parties here were less scrupulous or the bankruptcy court less vigilant, a 
weakened absolute priority rule could allow for serious mischief between 
senior creditors and existing shareholders.”71 
Even in the context of the absolute priority rule, however, not all principles 
constraining the behavior of the parties that are not so hard-edged. The 
bankruptcy judge, in addition to determining that the plan respects absolute 
priority, must also find, when a class votes against the plan, that the plan is 
“fair and equitable” and does not “discriminate unfairly.”72 These phrases have 
become terms of art over the course of more than a century of Supreme Court 
learning. They are sometimes used in a way that suggests that they embody 
only a substantive commitment to absolute priority.73 This is a mistake. 
 
67 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2012). 
68 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2012). 
69 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (2012). 
70 See DISH Network v. DBSD North America, Inc., 634 F.3d 79, 100 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“A]lthough Congress did soften the absolute priority rule in some ways, it did not create any 
exception for ‘gifts’ like the one at issue here.”). 
71 DBSD, 634 F.3d at 100. 
72 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2012). 
73 See Baird, supra note 14, at 614-15 (reviewing the Supreme Court’s reception of cases on 
plan confirmation). 
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Consider a case in which a substantial shareholder of a business is also 
its CEO. The debtor proposes a plan in which the equity of the reorganized 
firm will go entirely to the old senior creditor. The senior creditor agrees 
to keep the CEO on as a consultant after the reorganization and will pay 
her with stock options. The general creditors receive nothing under the plan 
and oppose it. The debtor puts on witnesses showing that the business is 
not worth enough to pay the senior creditor in full. Can the bankruptcy 
judge approve this plan? 
There are two different ways of characterizing the award of stock options 
to the CEO through the lens of the bankruptcy partition. The stock options 
could be seen as side payments from the senior creditor to the CEO to ensure 
that the CEO induces the debtor to put forward a plan that is to the senior 
creditor’s liking. The CEO, in this scenario, is less inclined to reveal 
information showing that the firm is worth enough to put the general creditors 
in the money. As a result, the bankruptcy judge is not able to ensure that the 
value of the estate is maximized, and the arrangement is objectionable. 
Alternatively, the judge might uphold the award of the options if she is 
confident that it does not interfere with her ability to police the assets inside 
the bankruptcy partition. If the firm is not worth enough to pay the senior 
creditor, it belongs to that creditor. The creditor is entitled to retain 
whomever it wants as a consultant. If the judge finds that the transaction is 
offered to the CEO in her capacity as a provider of future services, rather 
than in exchange for manipulating the bankruptcy process, the bankruptcy 
judge should not strike it down. Such services are not assets of the estate. 
They are outside the partition. 
The “fair and equitable” language of the Bankruptcy Code addresses 
situations in which the senior creditor makes transfers to other stakeholders 
in the context of a plan. As the cases that developed the “fair and equitable” 
doctrine make plain, the focus is not on the distributions themselves, but 
rather on the process that led to the plan of reorganization.74 Is the CEO 
taking a payment in return for agreeing to look the other way rather than to 
maximize the value of the estate, or is she an outsider selling future services 
in an arm’s length transaction? The bankruptcy judge focuses on whether the 
parties are acting in a way that ensures that the value of the assets within the 
bankruptcy partition is being maximized. 
The bankruptcy judge’s ability to ensure the integrity of the plan process 
extends beyond transfers from one stakeholder to another. Assume, for 
example, that the CEO is not a shareholder at all. The senior creditor offers 
 
74 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913) (noting that a creditor “having 
refused to come into a just reorganization, could not thereafter be heard in a court of equity to attack 
it”). 
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her a lucrative consulting contract even though it is clear that her services are 
no longer needed. (She has, for example, retired and moved out of state.) The 
bankruptcy judge can refuse to confirm such a plan on the ground that it was 
not proposed in good faith.75 What matters is whether the CEO is receiving a 
side payment because of the control she is able to exercise over the process, not 
whether she is a stakeholder herself or receiving property of the estate. 
Outside the plan confirmation process, the Bankruptcy Code offers less 
explicit guidance, but it remains the judge’s obligation to ensure that those 
with control are using their powers in service of maximizing the value of the 
estate. Imagine a senior creditor who desires a speedy auction in which it 
might well prove to be the only bidder. The secured creditor suggests that the 
debtor propose such an auction. At the same time, the secured creditor offers 
the CEO a consulting contract that requires little actual work. Here too, the 
judge can refuse to approve the sale.76 The senior creditor’s promise of money 
to the CEO may make the judge suspect that the speedy auction being 
proposed is not one that will maximize value. 
Whenever these payments become large enough, the bankruptcy judge is 
likely to find that what are characterized as “tips” are nothing of the sort. 
They are just the price that the secured creditor is willing to pay to insulate 
its plan from close scrutiny. The Bankruptcy Code is designed to ensure that 
parties who exercise control work to maximize the value of the estate. 
Stakeholders cannot strike deals in which they agree to drop objections in 
return for payoffs that go only to them.77 
Distinguishing between illicit side payments and legitimate tips is our 
principal concern. What must be recognized, however, is that the regulation 
of these payments matters not because a creditor or shareholder is receiving 
a payment to which she is not entitled under bankruptcy’s distribution 
scheme, but because the payment keeps the bankruptcy judge from protecting 
the assets inside the bankruptcy partition. Payments that buy off those with 
 
75 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012) (requiring plans to be “proposed in good faith and not by 
any means forbidden by law”). For a variation on these facts, see In re Bush Indus., 315 B.R. 292, 
306 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that offering a “golden parachute” to a principal officer of a 
corporation constituted a violation of good faith obligations). 
76 One might think that bankruptcy law need not play a role here. The CEO who accepts 
payment for a consulting contract when her advice is emphatically not wanted (but whose 
cooperation is essential) is probably violating her fiduciary duties to the corporation. The implicit 
quid pro quo is that she will look the other way and not attend to maximizing the value of the 
assets for the benefit of all the stakeholders. But the contours of those duties can be hard to 
delineate, and the bankruptcy judge has a responsibility to ensure that there is a process that leads 
to the assets being put to their highest and best use, independent of whether there are violations 
of nonbankruptcy duties. 
77 See Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 208 (1945) (holding that stakeholders who sold 
interests at a premium in return for dropping an appeal must account to others in their class for the 
difference between what they received and the fair value of their interest in the debtor). 
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control are illegitimate even if the money does not come from the estate and 
even if it does not go to an old shareholder or other stakeholders, as is the 
case when the secured creditor hands over its own money to a CEO who owns 
no stock. The payments between stakeholders may be either appropriate 
“tips” or impermissible bribes, but they are not “distributions.” 
The ability of parties to divert value is limited only by their own 
imaginations. It is not even necessary for money to pass from one player to 
another. A plan might include a rights-offering that gives one of the players 
the ability to acquire an interest in the reorganized entity at a discounted 
price.78 The discount might reflect what is necessary to obtain the 
commitment of new capital that the business requires, but there is also a less 
innocent possibility. It might be the price paid to persuade someone with 
influence to look the other way. 
Alternatively, value can be diverted through a “backstop.” A plan 
proponent might want to give securities in the reorganized firm to an old 
creditor, but it may be hard for a court to know whether the new securities are 
worth what the plan proponent claims. The plan proponent can allay this 
concern by obtaining a “backstop.” The provider of the backstop promises to 
buy the new securities at the value set out in the plan (in the event that the 
old creditor would rather have cash instead). The willingness of a third party 
to buy the security at a particular price provides evidence of its value. But the 
commitment to buy a security for a fixed price does not magically appear. It is 
a put, and someone will sell a put only if adequately compensated. Hence, the 
plan proponent must pay the person who is furnishing the backstop. When 
the person who provides the backstop is also a player in the bankruptcy 
process, there is again cause for concern. The fee for the backstop might reflect 
the market value of the backstop, but the plan proponent might be paying 
more than the market price. Buying a backstop at a premium can again divert 
value to an existing player in a position to exercise control over the case. 
Sensibly distinguishing between rights offerings and backstops that are 
legitimate from those that divert value requires judgment and the sound 
exercise of discretion. It is a problem cut from the same cloth as bankruptcy’s 
prohibition on “gifting.” These and other devices that have the potential to 
distort the bankruptcy process can arise in many contexts, and again they have 
nothing to do with bankruptcy’s distributional rules. Bankruptcy judges must 
police the parties to ensure that side payments do not compromise the 
 
78 For an excellent discussion of rights offerings and backstops, see Jane Lee Vris & Alexandra 
S. Kelly, Rights Offerings Get Popular—and Contentious, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 7, 2011), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202484161899/ [https://perma.cc/4PJ6-GYF3] 
(discussing three main categories of objections to rights offerings and backstops). 
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process. As the Supreme Court put it long ago, the court should not “become 
the mere silent registrar of the agreements . . . .”79 
III. BARGAINING ACROSS THE PARTITION 
Return to the hypothetical in which the private equity fund was willing to 
settle only if there was no distribution to the workers. It is possible that 
everyone’s cards were on the table. There was no infirmity in the private equity 
investor’s security interest. No lawyer would take up an avoidance action 
against it because the costs of litigation vastly exceeded the expected value of 
the action. But the private equity fund is still willing to pay something to have 
this action disappear once and for all. It knows that the creditors’ committee 
lacks the resources to litigate the matter, but the cause of action will continue 
to exist even if the bankruptcy case is dismissed. This itself is an irritant even 
if it is exceedingly unlikely that anyone will bring the action. The private 
equity fund might not, for example, be able to close out some of its funds as 
long as the cause of action lingers. 
The private equity fund is willing to pay something to make the action go 
away. It benefits if it can close out its investment in the debtor. But it is 
exactly for this reason that the private equity firm has no interest in any 
settlement that includes the workers. It is not willing to buy peace if it comes 
at the cost of triggering litigation from another quarter. 
There is no commandeering or corruption of the process. The opportunity 
to settle with the private equity fund belongs to the estate and can be 
monetized only if the representatives of the estate can strike a deal with the 
private equity fund. When approached to make such a settlement, the private 
equity fund stands outside the bankruptcy partition. The estate is seeking to 
trade one asset (a fraudulent conveyance action that it cannot pursue) for 
another (the money the equity fund is willing to pay to make the action go 
away). Seeking to maximize the value of the estate by striking such deals is 
an essential part of the bankruptcy process. 
Let us assume there is no question of the creditors’ committee selling out 
other creditors. An independent trustee would confront the same bargaining 
dynamic. Moreover, unlike the hypothetical in which a stranger appears and 
offers cash to distort the distributional scheme, the transaction is Pareto 
superior. Taking the money does not deprive the workers of anything they 
would otherwise receive. With or without the deal with the private equity 
fund, they will receive nothing. The settlement makes the others creditors 
better off without leaving the workers any worse off. 
 
79 Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chi. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 688-89 (1899). 
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Such value-maximizing transactions seem in principle unproblematic even 
if they are with prepetition creditors or someone else with a history with the 
debtor. It is irrelevant that the transaction benefits someone who is also a player 
in the bankruptcy, as long as the relevant transaction is a bargain to obtain 
something that is outside the bankruptcy partition. Mutually beneficial trading 
between the estate and a third party leaves both better off by nature. 
But there are important qualifications to this general principle. In policing 
the process, the bankruptcy judge must also take account of the potential for 
parties to engage in strategic behavior and the potential for error. Ruling 
some transactions out of bounds may bring benefits across the mine run of 
cases, even if some value-maximizing transactions in individual cases are lost 
in the process. Tying oneself to the mast is sometimes a good idea. Moreover, 
the bankruptcy judge must be able to identify whether a transaction in fact 
makes the estate better off. When a transaction is too hard to assess, it may 
make sense for her to step away, especially given the ability of parties to reach 
bargains on the side. 
A. Deals with Nonstrategic Prepetition Actors 
The Bankruptcy Code expressly allows deals with prepetition creditors 
where there is an executory contract between the debtor and the creditor.80 If 
the debtor chooses to assume an executory contract, payments will be made 
to the nondebtor party to the contract. Depending on how much it will cost 
the other party to complete the contract, it may be better off if the contract 
is assumed. Whether the third party benefits is irrelevant.81 Even though the 
party to the executory contract will be paid in full while other creditors will 
not be, blessing the assumption of many of these contracts is an entirely 
uncontroversial application of 11 U.S.C. § 365.82 
 
80 A prepetition contract is “executory” when, at the time of the petition, there are meaningful 
obligations owing on both sides. For the classical discussion, see Vern Countryman, Executory 
Contracts in Bankruptcy (Part I), 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973) (defining an executory contract 
as one in which “the failure of either [party] to complete performance would constitute a material 
breach excusing the performance of the other”). 
81 There is a qualification to this point. If the transaction is manifestly beneficial to the 
nondebtor party to the executory contract, the debtor might reject the contract (or threaten to 
reject the contract) and renegotiate the deal on better terms. One could argue that this ability to 
renegotiate is something that the debtor should take into account in deciding whether to assume 
or reject the contract. For the same reason, the bankruptcy judge should take into account the 
ability to renegotiate in deciding whether to bless this decision. For our purposes, however, what 
matters is that the provision governing executory contracts explicitly empowers the debtor to pay 
off someone who is a prepetition creditor, using as her benchmark whether it makes the other 
creditors better off. 
82 To take a concrete example, assume that the debtor has a contract with A in which the debtor 
promises to pay A $10 in a week’s time for a specialized part. And assume that the transaction will, 
after the $10 is paid, make the debtor’s business worth $25. Assume further that, if the debtor fails to 
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The focus of the judge in reviewing the decision to assume an executory 
contract is on the effect of the assumption on the value of the bankruptcy 
estate. The only question is whether the decision to assume requires a payout 
from the estate that is less than what the estate will receive from the third 
party. The party to the executory contract is receiving the money only 
because of rights she established outside of bankruptcy long before the 
bankruptcy began. She is not engaging in holdout behavior or otherwise 
undermining the bankruptcy process. The relevant asset—her performance 
under the contract—is outside the bankruptcy partition, unless the estate 
performs its end of the bargain. 
An executory contract is only one of many types of deals into which a 
debtor can enter that enhance the value of the estate. Courts have generally 
accepted the idea that bankruptcy judges can approve transactions with 
prepetition creditors beyond the context of executory contracts. The common 
touchstone is whether such deals result in the estate being better off.83 There 
are problems of proof in many cases, but clear examples of value-enhancing 
transactions are easy to find. 
In the Chapter 11 of Marvel Entertainment, for example, the debtor 
proposed, and the court approved, continuing shipment of products for which 
customers had already paid.84 It was not burdensome to continue shipping, as 
the production costs were largely sunk. More to the point, a failure to ship 
would sow unhappiness in the customer base. The products in question were 
comic books, and the prepaying buyers were subscribers. 
Apart from the sheer silliness of serving tens of thousands of twelve-year-olds 
with proper notice and inviting them to be heard as creditors in the case, 
demanding they pay a second time for Spiderman and the Fantastic Four would 
 
go through with the deal, its assets will be worth only $20 and its contracting opposite, A, will have 
to scrap the part and will have lost $10. In this event, A will have an unsecured claim against the 
estate for $10. Other creditors are owed $50. If the debtor in possession asks the court for permission 
to assume this contract, the court should grant it. 
Rejecting the executory contract leads to $60 in claims ($50 from other creditors and the 
additional $10 claim from A) chasing $20 in assets. Each creditor receives 33 cents on the dollar. By 
contrast, if the trustee assumes the contract, the creditors (a group that no longer includes A) receive 
50 cents on the dollar ($50 in claims chasing $25 in assets). For a discussion of some of the other 
dynamics and effects arising from assumption decisions, see Kenneth Ayotte, Leases and Executory 
Contracts in Chapter 11, 12 J. EMP. LEGAL STUDIES 637, 656-59 (2015). 
83 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872-74 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the record did 
not reflect that preferential payments to a handful of Kmart’s vendors would benefit the 
remaining creditors). 
84 See DAN RAVIV, COMIC WARS: HOW TWO TYCOONS BATTLED OVER THE MARVEL 
COMICS EMPIRE—AND BOTH LOST 81-82 (2002). The buyers had already paid for the product. 
Because they had no obligations to Marvel, there was no executory contract to assume. Hence, the 
buyers were simply, as a matter of bankruptcy law, unsecured creditors. Analytically, of course, it 
makes no difference whether they had obligations to the debtor. What mattered was whether 
shipping the product made Marvel on net better off. 
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have undermined the future of the comic business. Stopping the shipment of 
the comics would have saved little money and caused considerable 
reputational damage. All the other stakeholders would have been worse off if 
subscribers were treated like ordinary creditors. For these purposes, the 
twelve-year-olds were more sensibly treated in their capacity as future 
customers (who stand outside the partition) rather than their capacities as 
prepetition creditors (who stand inside). What was valuable to the estate (the 
goodwill of the subscribers) was not something that the estate enjoyed as of 
right. It resided outside the partition. The estate could continue to enjoy it 
only by servicing the subscriptions. 
A similar issue arises with respect to frequent flyer miles in an airline 
bankruptcy. The obligation of an airline to provide additional services (in the 
form of free travel and upgrades) generates a “claim” within the meaning of the 
Bankruptcy Code.85 Because the obligation arises before the filing of the 
petition, it is again a prepetition claim that ordinarily would be cashed out at 
cents on the dollar just like any other. But few doubt that the bankruptcy judge 
can approve a motion to honor frequent flyer miles. It is just good business. 
The relevant question is not whether some creditors receive more than 
others, but again whether what the estate wanted—the continued business of 
frequent flyers—was something that belonged to it or something outside the 
partition that it had to use estate assets to acquire. Because the frequent flyers 
had no obligation to continue to fly with the debtor, the estate needed to keep 
them happy. That the frequent flyers happened to be prepetition creditors 
was neither here nor there, so long as the estate had no claim on their future 
patronage and was better off spending money to secure it. Similarly, it might 
be good business for a durable goods manufacturer, such as an automobile 
company, to continue to honor warranties in order to ensure the integrity of 
the brand and the good will associated with it. Discontent among existing 
customers might deter future ones.86 
 
85 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2012) (defining “claim” as “the right to an equitable remedy for breach 
of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment”). 
86 A similar problem can arise when the debtor settles some types of liability claims. Consider, 
a firm manufactures an intrauterine birth control device (IUD) that proves defective. Facing massive 
tort liability, it files for bankruptcy. Many who used the IUDs were rendered infertile. If the estate 
pays for their tubal ligation surgery immediately, they might be able to have children and only 
pursue small claims against the estate. But if the estate does not pay for the surgery, the victims will 
have a claim both for the costs of the surgery and the damage from being rendered infertile—an 
amount at least an order of magnitude larger than the cost of the surgery. The atmospherics in this 
case are somewhat different than in the typical critical-vendor case. The purpose of making an early 
payment to the tort victims is to reduce the total claims against the estate by an amount that is much 
larger than the cost of the surgery itself. What matters is that money can be spent and, as a result, 
there is an increase in what every other stakeholder will receive from the estate. This is enough to 
create a potential problem. This hypothetical is closely based on the facts of Official Committee of 
Equity Security Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 299-302 (4th Cir. 1987). In that case, the court found 
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When a payment to a prepetition creditor is proposed and someone 
objects, the bankruptcy judge, in addition to assessing the evidence that the 
payment is value enhancing, will focus as much on the process that led to the 
proposal. From her perspective, the question is not whether the payment 
violates some distributional rule, but rather whether the process itself was 
one that allows the judge to infer that the deal being presented is a good one 
and other alternatives are not available. 
B. Bargaining with Strategic Actors 
All the examples of transactions with prepetition creditors examined so far 
involve payments to entirely passive prepetition creditors. The passive role 
makes it easier for the bankruptcy judge to conclude that those controlling the 
estate are paying them because it is good business. The only ones able to 
influence the decision had interests aligned with those of the estate as a whole. 
But this is not always the case—consider In re Chrysler LLC.87 
When Chrysler filed for Chapter 11 and proposed selling its assets, the 
prospective buyer of Chrysler offered the estate $2 billion, far less than 
Chrysler’s secured creditors were owed.88 The buyer also agreed to pay 
substantial retirement benefits to Chrysler’s workers. These benefits were 
unsecured prepetition claims against Chrysler.89 
The focus in the first instance should be on why the retirees were being 
paid. The buyer—in effect the federal government—may have simply wanted 
to bestow largess upon the retirees. In this event, the payments are not 
problematic. A third party’s desire to bestow largess on someone who 
happens to be a prepetition creditor violates no bankruptcy policy. Indeed, in 
the absence of any other buyer willing to pay more than $2 billion, Chrysler’s 
senior creditors themselves were themselves beneficiaries of government 
largess. As such, they were hardly in a position to complain that someone else 
was receiving largess as well.90 
 
that the district court lacked the power to make the payment. Id. at 302. However, no other circuits 
have followed its lead. Even in its own circuit, the case, because of its suspect reasoning, is read 
extremely narrowly. See, e.g., Coleman v. Cmty. Tr. Bank (In re Coleman), 426 F.3d 719, 726 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (quoting Mabey for the proposition that “the equitable powers that a bankruptcy court 
possesses ‘are not a license . . . to disregard the clear language and meaning of the bankruptcy 
statutes and rules.’”). 
87 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated, Ind. State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 
1087 (2009). 
88 Id. at 111-12. 
89 Id. 
90 In In re Chrysler, the government was the high bidder and no one else wanted to operate 
Chrysler as a going concern. Id. at 112. There is, however, an important caveat. The bankruptcy judge 
may have chilled other bidders. The auction process was set up in such a way as to make it hard to 
submit bids that did not include paying the retirees, even if the bids were for more than $2 billion. 
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More likely, however, the buyer chose to pay the benefits to the retirees 
because the existing workers would have gone on strike if the buyer was 
unwilling to pay the retirees, and the business could not operate without 
them. The workers had a credible threat. Bankruptcy puts in place rules like 
the automatic stay that constrain the efforts of prepetition creditors to take 
actions against the debtor to extract the payment of prepetition claims. Such 
rules are a sensible part of the creditors’ bargain. Such behavior, and 
resistance against this type of behavior, consumes resources and threatens to 
put assets to less productive uses. Ensuring that bankruptcy has procedural 
rules to prevent such holdup behavior is part of maximizing the value of the 
estate. But these tools do not always work. 
The difference between the workers in Chrysler and the dispersed suppliers 
in the example we used earlier,91 to the extent one exists, is not about whether 
it is permissible to pay prepetition creditors. When the estate has no right to 
insist that suppliers, subscribers, frequent flyers, or workers continue to do 
business with the debtor, it may need to pay them money to keep them happy. 
In such a case, the estate is paying for something that lies outside the partition. 
There is nothing inherently problematic about transactions over the partition 
that enhance the value of the estate. Bankruptcy policy is implicated only if 
the suppliers, subscribers, frequent flyers, or workers, acting as prepetition 
creditors, are undermining the collective proceeding and the judge has an 
ability to do something about it. 
The power of a judge to prevent prepetition creditors from refusing to 
deal with the business going forward is necessarily limited. As a matter of 
existing labor law, the power of the bankruptcy judge stops well short of 
requiring former employees of the debtor to continue to work for a new buyer. 
In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, employees can refuse to 
come to work for any reason or no reason at all.92 As long as the automatic 
stay does not trump labor law here, there is nothing the bankruptcy judge can 
do to order the employees back to work. 
In the absence of this power, the implicit threat of the workers to strike if 
the retirees are not paid is credible. One can, of course, prevent the judge 
 
This should not have happened. Senior creditors should always be able to object to a process in 
which the assets are being sold for less than the highest amount a third party was willing to pay for 
them, regardless of the use to which the third party would put them. 
91 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
92 In a decision that is hard to defend, the Second Circuit has, however, found an exception 
when the collective bargaining agreement involves the Railway Labor Act. See Nw. Airlines Corp. 
v. Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, 483 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that a preliminary 
injunction precluding the Association of Flight Attendants from engaging in any form of work 
stoppage was appropriate because the Railway Labor Act “forbids an immediate strike when a 
bankruptcy court approves a debtor-carrier’s rejection of a collective bargaining agreement that is 
subject to the Railway Labor Act”). 
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from approving payments to prepetition creditors, but an outright 
prohibition cuts broadly. Moreover, such a prohibition serves its purpose only 
if, when the judge prevents the estate from dealing with the workers, the 
workers continue to do business with the estate. 
Another type of transaction with prepetition creditors who have 
negotiating power arises when the debtor seeks postpetition financing. Before 
the petition was filed, the debtor might have had a relationship with a certain 
bank that provided it credit. At the time of filing the debtor owes that bank 
a sizeable amount. To keep doing business as usual, the debtor needs new 
credit to fund its ongoing operations. The bank that provided the financing 
prepetition agrees to provide postpetition financing, but it insists that a 
portion of the new loan be used to pay off its old loans. 
The effect of such a “roll-up” is to pay off prepetition debt. The bank 
ceases to be a prepetition creditor and instead becomes an extender of 
postpetition credit and enjoys the stronger rights associated with that status. 
Roll-ups, by their nature, lead to prepetition debt being paid off—and paid 
off with first priority. 
The bank, of course, is exploiting its leverage. Other prospective 
postpetition financers do not know as much about the debtor as the bank does, 
and the bank has this knowledge as a result of its prepetition relationship with 
the debtor. But again, the focus should be on crafting rules that keep creditors 
from exploiting such leverage. 
One might, of course, sharply limit critical vendor orders, at least when 
the suppliers are active in the case. Similarly, one might ban roll-ups entirely. 
If a person is disabled from paying ransom, she will be subject to fewer ransom 
demands in the first instance. Preventing hold-up behavior by prepetition 
creditors is a tricky business, however. A rule that is too broad would sweep in 
actors—such as small suppliers, comic-book subscribers, frequent flyers, 
holders of product warranties, and tort victims—who are prepetition creditors, 
but are not in any sense acting strategically or engaging in hold-up behavior. 
Moreover, the prohibition does not operate when the party’s own self-interest 
will lead it to refuse to reach a deal unless its terms are met. 
To return to the hypothetical in which the private equity fund demands 
a particular distribution because it has no interest in replacing one lawsuit 
with another, a ban on the settlement might block a value-enhancing deal.93 
 
93 Einer Elhauge explores these issues in a variety of contexts. See Einer Elhauge, Contrived 
Threats Versus Uncontrived Warnings: A General Solution to the Puzzles of Contractual Duress, 83 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 503, 507 (2016) (arguing that “a threat to engage in otherwise-lawful action that induces 
contract modification is unlawfully coercive only when the threat is contrived, meaning that the 
threatened action would not have occurred if no threat could have been made”). 
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There is a strong temptation to allow the judge to approve any transaction 
that is Pareto superior.94 
One might argue, however, that bankruptcy judges should walk away from 
some transactions. In addition to accounting for strategic behavior, 
bankruptcy law must also take account of the difficulties in determining 
whether the transaction is in fact aboveboard and wealth-enhancing. 
Payments to insiders and strategic players are always troublesome. The more 
ties the estate has with a party, the more likely it is that the deal is not what 
it appears to be. And the more exotic the transaction, the less likely it is that 
the bankruptcy judge can completely understand what is going on.95 
C. Judicial Restraint and Coasean Bargaining 
A judge’s refusal to bless a transaction is not the end of the matter. If a 
transaction that the judge refuses to approve would leave the remaining 
creditors better off, there is still a deal to be struck. If all the affected parties 
consent, no bankruptcy policy prevents such a deal from being consummated. 
For this reason, a judge’s inability to prevent a party from making a credible 
threat and her refusal to approve a transaction with someone outside the 
partition will not necessarily leave the prepetition creditors without the 
benefit of a mutually beneficial bargain. 
Bankruptcy, of course, posits the existence of a collective action problem 
that prevents the parties from reaching an agreement with each other, but 
part of the way bankruptcy solves the collective action problem is by making 
it easier for parties to bargain with each other in parallel with the bankruptcy 
process. The possibility that parties will be able to reach a bargain with each 
other in bankruptcy reduces the risk that creditors will end up in a place that 
is contrary to their collective interests. This may be especially important 
when the only issue on the table is simply a question of distributing the assets 
at the end of the case. Unlike critical vendor orders or dip financing, the deal 
to be made does not involve operational decisions, decisions that creditors as 
a group may have difficulty assessing. 
 
94 Justice Kagan focused on this issue in oral argument in Jevic, couching the problem in exactly 
these terms, specifically discussing the notion of “Pareto superiority.” See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 44, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017) (No. 15-694) (stating that 
a “Pareto-superior solution . . . might be a completely sensible bankruptcy provision”). 
95 Justice Breyer emphasized this point at oral argument in Jevic when he asked what would 
happen if someone controlled the pirate’s gold that lay buried beneath the debtor’s land and was 
willing to part with it only under the condition that it be given to a creditor that happened to be 
that person’s cousin. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41-43, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 
S. Ct. 973 (2017) (No. 15-649). On the face of it, cutting a deal seems Pareto superior, but one can 
never be sure. There might be other ways of getting the gold. 
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There are only a handful of bankruptcy judges who hear large cases, and 
there are comparatively few lawyers who litigate before them. The local rules 
and the practices of individual judges fix the structure of the bargaining that 
takes place outside the courtroom. The bankruptcy judge may want to limit 
her own discretion going forward. She must worry about both Type I as well 
as Type II errors. And having in place clear rules about what sorts of 
transactions she will and will not approve establishes the environment in 
which creditors bargain. 
Consider again Jevic, the recent case presenting this issue to the 
Supreme Court. The bankruptcy judge below found that, in the absence of 
approving the settlement, none of the creditors would receive anything.96 
But it is possible that if the judge had refused to approve the settlement, 
some new bargain would have emerged.97 One can imagine a deal that would 
distribute value to the workers that would overcome the private equity 
fund’s resistance to funding litigation against it. The parties, for example, 
could set up a “litigation escrow.”98 
A fund could be created in which a third party held the funds until after the 
statute of limitations for the workers’ independent action against the private 
equity fund expired. To prevent the workers from borrowing against it, the 
escrow agreement might also provide that the workers would enjoy none of the 
money if they used the funds as collateral for a loan. If the existence of the 
litigation escrow would itself make financing of the lawsuit possible, a 
settlement might require that its existence be kept secret. We are not suggesting 
such litigation escrows are a good idea. Rather, we are noting only that the 
parties might still have reached a settlement even if the judge refused to enforce 
the deal presented and insisted that the parties continue negotiating. 
Of course, it is possible that no deal would be reached. Cooler heads do 
not always prevail. But one of the functions of bankruptcy is to create an 
environment in which forging an agreement among the parties is possible. 
Assessing how the bankruptcy judge should exercise her discretion to approve 
transactions with those who hold prepetition claims as well as assets outside 
the partition is linked to the bargaining environment in which the parties find 
themselves. This bargaining environment is in turn shaped by the rules of 
engagement that the Bankruptcy Code puts in place. 
 
96 See In re Jevic Holding Corp., 492 B.R. 416, 422 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013), aff ’d, 526 B.R. 547 
(D. Del. 2014), aff ’d, 656 F. App’x 617 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that at the time of the bankruptcy filing, 
Jevic had no viable offer of sale or available funding). 
97 We are, of course, speculating here. There are likely aspects to the case to which we are 
not privy. In assessing the merits of the decision itself, there is much to be said for deferring to 
the judgment of the extremely able bankruptcy judge who was on the ground and attuned to 
everything that was occurring. 
98 Releases of claims properly structured might also achieve the desired bargain. 
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Cases in which maximizing the value of the estate actually requires 
proceeds from an otherwise beneficial transaction to be distributed in a 
particular fashion are rare. It is seldom the case that, holding its own share 
constant, one party affirmatively wants some of the other parties to receive 
more and others less. Rational economic actors care about their own welfare, 
not on how an arm’s length transaction affects the welfare of some other party. 
And even when such cases exist, the number of transactions that cannot be 
salvaged through bargaining among the stakeholders may be rarer still. 
Exceptions can, of course, be found in bankruptcy. An outright 
prohibition on deals that depart from distributional rules would have made 
the creditors worse off in the bankruptcy of the City of Detroit. The city 
owned the art museum and the creditors pressed for a sale of its treasures. 
The mediator in the case organized a “Grand Bargain” in which a group of 
foundations and the state of Michigan contributed $800 million in return for 
putting the museum into private hands permanently. But the state and the 
foundation were willing to contribute this money only if it was used to pay 
benefits to workers, not if it went to institutional lenders. Both entities were 
willing to help put Detroit and the people who lived there back on their feet. 
Neither had any interest in bailing out municipal bondholders.99 
Here the bankruptcy court was in fact faced with a choice of approving a 
transaction that could take place only if the proceeds of the transaction 
favored one set of general creditors at the expense of another. Forbidding a 
departure from bankruptcy’s distributional rules would have prevented the 
Grand Bargain. No amount of private bargaining would have led the state or 
the foundations to give money to the bondholders. 
In re Detroit, however, may be an exception that proves the rule. A 
distinctive characteristic of a Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy that 
distinguishes it from a Chapter 11 corporate reorganization is that no estate 
is created.100 There is no partition with hard boundaries directing the 
parties to act with a narrow focus. 
One cannot exclude the possibility that Pareto superior transactions exist 
in Chapter 11 in which value will be lost unless there is a departure from 
bankruptcy’s distributional rules. But the rarity of such cases in Chapter 11 
favors a hardline rule. Strictly enforcing distributional rules limits costly 
rent-seeking. A creditor who cannot receive more than its pro-rata share is 
disabled from bargaining for more. The estate, in most cases, is better off with 
 
99 See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 169-71 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (outlining the terms 
of the state of Michigan’s contribution agreement with the city of Detroit). For a discussion of how 
the Grand Bargain was struck, see NATHAN BOMEY, DETROIT RESURRECTED: TO BANKRUPTCY 
AND BACK 129-61 (2016). 
100 See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012) (omitting § 541 from the list of Bankruptcy Code provisions 
that apply in Chapter 9). 
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fixed distributional rules especially when few, if any, cases actually require 
distributional flexibility. 
CONCLUSION 
Central to any account of bankruptcy is the bankruptcy partition and the 
challenges associated with locating it, policing conduct inside of it, and allowing 
transacting across it. A debtor might want to pay one group of creditors before 
the plan is confirmed to reduce friction in the negotiation process.101 Or it 
might agree to take actions that protect one creditor from a preference 
challenge in exchange for that creditor’s support of a smooth plan process.102 
These close-to-the-line partition questions implicate fundamental questions of 
bankruptcy policy. These sorts of actions shift value, usually from one set of 
institutional investors to another. Should the shift of value itself be something 
that troubles the judge, even if it benefits the estate? The answer to those 
questions is often reached through unspoken analysis of the bankruptcy 
partition. The tests that courts nominally apply do not focus on the bankruptcy 
partition explicitly, but the partition drives the analysis. A greater focus on the 
bankruptcy partition itself will lead to better bankruptcy decisionmaking. 
 
 
101 See In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 648 Fed. App’x. 277, 280-82 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(establishing that dispute settlement with a group of creditors using tender offer procedures was 
consistent with bankruptcy law). 
102 This could conceivably have been going on beneath the surface in the dispute over the filing 
date in the Caesars bankruptcy. See Motion of Statutory Unsecured Claimholders’ Committee 
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 363(B)(1) and 1107(A) to Compel Debtor to Consent to 
Involuntary Chapter 11 Petition at 2-3, In Re Caesars Entm’t Operating Co., No. 15-01145 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 7, 2015) (noting a dispute over the date on which debtors agreed to file the petition). 
